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Jones v. Chappell: The California Death 
Penalty is Unconstitutional 
By SIMON MAXWELL LEVY* 
[F]or most [inmates on death row], systemic delay has made their execution so unlikely 
that the death sentence carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been quietly 
transformed into one no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison, 
with the remote possibility of death.1 
Introduction 
ON JULY 16, 2014, Federal District Judge Cormac J. Carney held 
California’s death penalty scheme unconstitutional.2 The petitioner in the 
case, Ernest DeWayne Jones, raised a number of challenges to his death 
sentence, but Judge Carney focused on the inordinate delays associated with 
California’s post-conviction appeals process—delays that had already kept 
Jones on death row for nearly two decades. Based on the significant delay 
between the imposition of a death sentence and actual execution in 
California, Judge Carney held that it was essentially random which offenders 
were executed as opposed to dying from natural causes, suicide, or violent 
incidents in prison.3 This randomness stands in direct opposition to the 
United States Supreme Court’s mandate, handed down in Furman v. Georgia,4 
that the death penalty not be arbitrarily imposed. In ruling on Jones’s habeas 
petition, Judge Carney became the first judge in California to look at 
empirical evidence of the death penalty’s actual functioning in the state and 
to hold its scheme unconstitutional. 
This Note will examine the U.S. District Court for the Central District 
of California’s Jones v. Chappell opinion and consider its implications for 
 
 * Simon M. Levy, J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law (2015). The author 
would like to thank his parents and Julia for their love and support, and Professor Steven Shatz for 
his guidance, not just in this paper, but in navigating law school in general. The author also extends 
special thanks to Patrick Tuck and the rest of the University of San Francisco Law Review staff. 
 1. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
 2. Id. at 1069. 
 3. Id. at 1062. 
 4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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California’s death row population. Further, Jones’s consideration of empirical 
evidence has potentially far-reaching implications for future death penalty 
challenges. The arbitrariness in California’s death penalty jurisprudence and 
its consequences is not limited to the way those chosen to be executed for 
their crimes actually die, but also influences the way capital murder is 
defined, as well as when a prosecutor chooses to pursue the death penalty. 
Part I discusses relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent to the Jones 
decision and describes the current state of the death penalty in California. 
Part II analyzes Jones, focusing on its application of U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent to empirical evidence of arbitrariness in the application of the 
death penalty. Finally, Part III considers the implications for death row 
inmates in California and then describes the nature and sources of 
arbitrariness inherent in the California death penalty scheme and how the 
Jones decision may support other data-driven challenges to the death penalty 
in California. 
I. The Eighth Amendment and the California Death 
Penalty Scheme 
The Jones decision reflects Judge Carney’s understanding of the U.S. 
Supreme Court cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment and of the realities 
of the California death penalty scheme. Part A of the foregoing section 
reviews the relevant Eighth Amendment law, while Part B describes the 
California scheme in operation. 
A. The Eighth Amendment and the Problem of Arbitrariness 
and Delay 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishment.”5 In a series of decisions beginning in the 1970s, the U.S. 
Supreme Court established that, in order for the death penalty to comport 
with the Eighth Amendment, it must be applied in a consistent and orderly 
manner.6 More recently, the Court has struggled with the question of 
whether long delays between sentencing and execution contravene the 
Eighth Amendment’s mandate.7 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 6. See infra Parts I.A.1–2. 
 7. See infra Part I.A.3. 
LEVY_FINALEDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 1:09 PM 
Summer 2015] JONES V. CHAPPELL 653 
 
1. Overruling Death: Furman v. Georgia 
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, overruling 
the capital sentencing scheme in Georgia.8 In effect, Furman invalidated the 
death penalty laws of all thirty-nine states that allowed for death as a possible 
punishment.9 In Furman, empirical evidence demonstrated that only 15 to 
20% of offenders who were statutorily eligible for the death penalty in 
Georgia were eventually sentenced to death.10 Justices William Brennan and 
Thurgood Marshall believed that the death penalty was cruel and unusual 
per se.11 Whereas, Justices William Douglas, Potter Stewart, and Byron White 
believed that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied, but each for 
different reasons. The four dissenters saw no constitutional problem with the 
death penalty theoretically or as applied. Thus, the three concurring opinions 
of Justices White, Douglas, and Stewart controlled the decision. Ultimately, 
as discussed below, Justice Stewart’s and Justice White’s concurrences came 
to embody the holding of Furman as interpreted by the Court’s subsequent 
decisions.12 Both Justices Stewart and White were concerned that the death 
penalty was being arbitrarily imposed, but each defined the involved 
arbitrariness differently. 
Justice Stewart’s principal concern was the seemingly random way in 
which some defendants were selected to die, while others found guilty of 
committing similar crimes were not.13 To that effect, Justice Stewart 
described the petitioners in Furman as “among a capriciously selected random 
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.”14 For 
Justice Stewart, there was no legally significant way to explain why those 
defendants who received the death penalty were any more deserving than 
 
 8. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. 
 9. Id. at 417–18 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 435 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, 
Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1231 (2013). 
 11. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 360–70 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 12. Justice Douglas’s concurrence addressed the equal protection concerns created by the 
death penalty as applied at the time of Furman. Douglas explained: 
[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables 
the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor 
and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular 
minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position. 
Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring). Douglas observed that, with unfettered discretion to apply the 
death penalty to certain crimes, judges and juries were bound to be influenced by arbitrary and 
illegitimate factors such as prejudice based on class and race. 
 13. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 14. Id. 
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their similarly situated peers, rendering those death sentences wholly 
arbitrary.15 In this regard, Justice Stewart compared being sentenced to 
death to being struck by lightning.16 
Justice White’s concurrence addressed a similar concern to Justice 
Stewart’s, only framed slightly differently. Justice White discussed the 
infrequency of death sentences issued in Georgia relative to the number of 
death-eligible crimes committed.17 In Justice White’s view, the death penalty 
could not serve as a deterrent to future crime while being invoked so 
infrequently.18 He concluded that the death penalty would be cruel and 
unusual if it did not serve some societal end.19 Justice White explained:  
At the moment that [the death penalty] ceases realistically to further these 
purposes, . . . the emerging question is whether its imposition . . . would 
violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it would, for its 
imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinction of life . . . 
. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently 
excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth 
Amendment.20 
2. The Risk of Arbitrariness: Furman v. Georgia to McCleskey v. 
Kemp 
The “holding” of Furman is perhaps best understood as articulated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in its subsequent decisions interpreting it. In Gregg 
v. Georgia, the Court approved Georgia’s new death penalty scheme.21 That 
same day, the Court also approved of the statutory schemes implemented in 
Florida22 and Texas.23 In all three cases, the Court approved the statutes on 
their face based on the belief that the new laws upheld Furman’s mandate that 
the death penalty “could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that 
created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and 
 
 15. Id. at 310 (“[I]f any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced 
to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.”). 
 16. Id. at 309 (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck 
by lightning is cruel and unusual.”). 
 17. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
 18. Id. at 312 (“[C]ommon sense and experience tell us that seldom-enforced laws become 
ineffective measures for controlling human conduct and that the death penalty, unless imposed with 
sufficient frequency, will make little contribution to deterring those crimes for which it may be 
exacted.”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976). 
 22. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 23. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
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capricious manner.”24 The Court believed that the Georgia scheme 
accomplished this in two ways: (1) by more narrowly defining the class of 
death-eligible crimes,25 and (2) by providing for a comparative 
proportionality review of every death sentence by the Georgia Supreme 
Court.26 
Seven years after Gregg, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zant v. 
Stephens,27 which further articulated the principles discussed in Furman.28 In 
upholding the petitioners’ death sentences, Justice John Paul Stevens, writing 
for the majority, held that, to satisfy the Eighth Amendment, a death penalty 
scheme’s aggravating circumstances had to “genuinely narrow the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the 
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others 
found guilty of murder.”29 In both Gregg and Zant, the Court identified that 
reducing the number of statutorily death-eligible crimes, along with 
providing for comparative appellate review of each death sentence, was one 
way that a death penalty scheme could satisfy Furman’s mandate that the 
penalty not be arbitrarily imposed. 
The Court’s theory was that by limiting the number of death-eligible 
crimes to those deemed to be the most socially reprehensible, the likelihood 
that judges and juries would sentence perpetrators of those crimes to death 
would increase, thereby mitigating the possibility that impermissible factors 
such as race might influence their decision. Furthermore, the Georgia 
Supreme Court reviewed every death sentence, which would hypothetically 
ensure that the death penalty was applied in some kind of consistent 
fashion.30 The problem, however, was that these features were never tested 
in application in Georgia or in any other state.31 Instead, schemes exhibiting 
these characteristics on their face were approved as being compatible with 
Furman.32 
In McCleskey v. Kemp,33 the petitioner attempted to meaningfully test the 
Court’s theoretical approach to limiting arbitrariness in the death penalty’s 
 
 24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188. 
 25. Id. at 222 (White, J., concurring). 
 26. Id. at 196–98 (majority opinion). 
 27. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
 28. Id. at 876–77. 
 29. Id. at 877. 
 30. Id. at 876. 
 31. See Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1234. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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application.34 Despite the Court’s previous approval of the Georgia death 
penalty scheme on its face in Gregg and Zant, the petitioner in McCleskey sought 
to demonstrate that racial bias permeated the Georgia death penalty 
scheme.35 Warren McCleskey was an African American man, sentenced to 
death for killing a white police officer.36 In challenging his sentence, 
McCleskey presented the results of a study performed by Professor David 
Baldus and others (“Baldus Study”).37 Specifically, the Baldus Study 
demonstrated that defendants convicted of killing white victims in Georgia 
were more than four times as likely to receive the death penalty than if the 
victim was African American.38  
McCleskey presented two constitutional arguments to the Supreme 
Court based on this apparent discrimination: (1) that the influence of race on 
the imposition of the death penalty violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,39 and (2) that, in accordance with Furman, the 
influence of the arbitrary factor of race in the Georgia scheme violated the 
Eighth Amendment.40 
Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority, dismissed McCleskey’s 
equal protection claim on the basis that he did not produce evidence of 
discrimination in his conviction and sentencing.41 In other words, although 
McCleskey demonstrated a statewide discriminatory effect, he did not prove 
that his conviction was the product of discriminatory intent on behalf of 
anyone involved in his case.42 
The majority’s dismissal of McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment challenge 
appeared to foreclose the possibility of empirically based challenges to the 
death penalty.43 Justice Powell explained that the Georgia scheme was not 
 
 34. See id. at 286–87 (explaining that McCleskey attempted to demonstrate that race 
impermissibly influenced the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 283. 
 37. Id. at 286. The Baldus Study analyzed over 2,000 murders committed in Georgia 
throughout the 1970s. See DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, 
JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 5 (1990). 
 38. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. 
 39. Id. at 292–93. 
 40. Id. at 299. 
 41. Id. at 292–93. 
 42. Id. This is in line with the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis requiring a showing 
of intent when only disparate impact on a protected class is shown. See Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official 
act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely 
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”). 
 43. Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1241. 
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cruel and unusual for the familiar reasons that it narrowed “the class of 
murders subject to the death penalty” and provided for an “automatic appeal 
of a death sentence to the State Supreme Court.”44 Even in the face of the 
results of the Baldus Study, it appears that Justice Powell believed these 
safeguards adequately controlled the discretion of judges and juries in 
imposing death sentences. This allowed Justice Powell to dismiss 
McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment claim without questioning the reliability of 
the statistical evidence presented. Ultimately, Justice Powell concluded that 
the “risk of racial bias” in the Georgia scheme was not “constitutionally 
significant.”45 In so many words, the Court concluded that racial disparities, 
such as those presented by McCleskey, were inevitable in the criminal justice 
system, and, to the extent those disparities were problematic, it was the 
legislatures’ responsibility to fix them, not the Court’s.46 
3. Excessive Delay in Execution: Lackey Challenges 
In a series of cases in the last twenty years, death row inmates have 
challenged the excessive delays between sentence and execution. The first of 
such cases to draw attention from the Supreme Court was Lackey v. Texas, in 
which Justice Stevens authored a memorandum opinion respecting the 
denial of certiorari.47 Lackey claimed the fact that he had spent seventeen 
years on death row awaiting execution violated the Eighth Amendment.48 
Justice Stevens divided Lackey’s claims into two parts. First, that 
spending an excessive amount of time on death row exposes an inmate to the 
“death row phenomenon,” which can amount to psychological torture.49 
This phenomenon is described in Soering v. United Kingdom, where a European 
court considered whether to extradite a German national to the United 
States to face possible execution for multiple murders.50 The court stated, 
“[A]ccount is to be taken not only of the physical pain experienced but also, 
where there is a considerable delay before execution of the punishment, of 
 
 44. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302, 303. The Court also identified the fact that death trials were 
bifurcated and that defendants had the opportunity to present mitigating evidence as safeguards, 
limiting the possibility that a death sentence would be arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 302. 
 45. Id. at 313. 
 46. See id. at 314–19. 
 47. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, para. 81 (1989); see also Regina 
C. Donnelly, Soering v. United Kingdom: Whether the Continued Use of the Death Penalty in the United 
States Contradicts International Thinking?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 339, 340–
46, 350 (1990). 
 50. Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4, para. 11. 
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the sentenced person’s mental anguish of anticipating the violence he is to 
have inflicted on him.”51 At the time of this statement, the average delay 
between sentencing and execution in the State of Virginia was between six 
and eight years.52 Based on this period of delay, the European court 
unanimously voted not to extradite.53 
Second, Justice Stevens explained that long delays between sentencing 
and execution could sap the eventual execution of any penological purpose. 
In his Lackey memorandum, Justice Stevens explained that the Court had 
reinstated the death penalty in Gregg in part because the Justices believed the 
death penalty might serve the penological purposes of retribution and 
deterrence.54 While acknowledging that a claim like Lackey’s had never been 
considered by the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens gave serious consideration 
to the possibility that a seventeen-year delay (and counting) between issuance 
of a death sentence and execution might rob the death penalty of its supposed 
retributive or deterrent purposes.55 Long delays between sentencing and 
execution affect the value of the death penalty as a deterrent because they 
reduce the possibility that an inmate will actually be executed, rather than 
die in prison.56 Furthermore, the death penalty does not adequately serve a 
retributive purpose if society must wait an inordinate amount of time for an 
inmate, whose murderous conduct incites moral outrage, to be executed.57 
Since Lackey, other death row inmates have asserted similar claims—
delays in their post-conviction appeal processes—rendered their sentences 
unconstitutional.58 In more recent cases, Justice Stephen Breyer has taken 
the mantle from Justice Stevens in dissenting from denial of certiorari in cases 
involving Lackey claims. In Elledge v. Florida, the petitioner spent twenty-three 
years awaiting the conclusion of his post-conviction appeals process.59 Justice 
Breyer reiterated Justice Stevens’s concerns from Lackey.60 Additionally, 
Justice Breyer characterized the petitioner’s claim as “serious” because the 
 
 51. Id. at 33, para. 100. 
 52. Id. at 17, para. 56. 
 53. Id. at 43, para. 1. 
 54. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (mem.) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of 
certiorari) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). 
 55. Id. (“Though novel, petitioner’s claim is not without foundation.”). 
 56. See infra Part II.B. 
 57. See infra Part II.B. 
 58. See, e.g., Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Knight v. Florida, 
528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 59. Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944. 
 60. Id. 
LEVY_FINALEDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 1:09 PM 
Summer 2015] JONES V. CHAPPELL 659 
 
delay was the result of the State’s own faulty post-conviction process.61 
In Knight v. Florida, the Court denied certiorari of Lackey claims asserted 
by two petitioners who had been on death row for nearly twenty and twenty-
five years, respectively.62 Again, Justice Breyer dissented from denial of 
certiorari, arguing that as a rule, a delay of at least twenty years or more 
between sentencing and execution raised constitutional concerns about the 
validity of an inmate’s death sentence.63 In support of his argument, Justice 
Breyer cited the same concerns he and Justice Stevens had articulated in 
earlier cases, as well as the fact that the number of inmates who had spent 
more than twenty years on death row was multiplying across the country.64 
Justice Clarence Thomas disagreed and argued that giving death row 
inmates yet another constitutional challenge to their death sentence would 
only extend the delays between sentencing and execution.65 Furthermore, 
Justice Thomas concluded that in the five years since the Court’s denial of 
certiorari in Lackey, lower courts across the country had “resoundingly 
rejected” the claim that delay between sentencing and execution raised 
concerns about the constitutionality of an inmate’s death sentence.66 
Therefore, according to Justice Thomas, the legitimacy of Lackey-type claims 
was no longer a live issue.67 Justice Breyer disagreed on this point, noting that 
only four lower court decisions addressed a Lackey claim on the merits, and, 
in three of those four cases, the delay was less than twenty years.68 
B. The California Death Penalty Scheme 
The California death penalty scheme is unique in its scope, which is at 
least part of the reason that California is home to the largest death row 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); id. at 993–94 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 999 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Finally, the constitutional issue, even if limited to delays 
of close to 20 years or more, has considerable practical importance.”). 
 64. Id. at 993, 999. 
 65. Id. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 992–93 (“Five years ago, Justice Stevens issued an invitation to state and lower 
courts to serve as ‘laboratories’ in which the viability of this claim could receive further study. . . . I 
submit that the Court should consider the experiment concluded.”). 
 68. Id. at 998 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1996)) (twenty-year delay); Ex parte Bush, 695 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1997) (sixteen-year delay); State v. 
Smith, 931 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1996) (thirteen-year delay); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1998) 
(sixteen-year delay). 
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population in the nation.69 The breadth of the California scheme,70 the 
delays in the post-conviction appeals process,71 and the population of death 
row72 have grown together for the past four decades. 
California’s current death penalty scheme is a product of a 1978 state 
ballot proposition known as the “Briggs Initiative,” which replaced the 
narrower 1977 Death Penalty Law and greatly increased the number of 
death-eligible crimes.73 The Briggs Initiative was advertised to voters as 
“giv[ing] Californians the toughest death penalty law in the country.”74 The 
Briggs Initiative attempted to, and arguably did, accomplish this goal by 
more than doubling the number of special circumstances—which make a 
first-degree murderer death-eligible—bringing the total number of death-
eligible murders from twelve to twenty-eight.75 
Since 1978, the breadth of the California scheme has been expanded 
by voter initiatives in 1990,76 1996,77 and 2000,78 each time increasing the 
number of special circumstances that may trigger death eligibility. The heart 
of the California death penalty scheme is contained in section 190.2 of the 
California Penal Code, which delineates the list of special circumstances.79 
There are currently twenty-two such circumstances specifically enumerated 
 
 69. Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-
year?scid=9&did=188#state (last visited May 7, 2015). 
 70. See infra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1312 (1997). 
 74. California Center for Research and Education in Government, California Journal Ballot 
Proposition Analysis, CAL. J., Nov. 1978, at 4–5;Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the 
Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty 
Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S142 (2011). 
 75. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S137–38. 
 76. In 1990, California voters passed Propositions 114 and 115, which added five more 
special circumstances and increased the number of death-eligible crimes to thirty-three. Crime 
Victims Justice Reform Act, ch. 1165, sec. 16, 1989 Cal. Stat. 4486, 4486–88 (codified at CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1990)); Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S143, S146. 
 77. In 1996, California voters passed Propositions 195 and 196, which added three more 
special circumstances, bringing the total number of death-eligible crimes to thirty-six. Alarcón & 
Mitchell, supra note 74, at S146. 
 78. In 2000, California voters passed Propositions 18 and 21, which added three additional 
special circumstances, increasing the number of death-eligible crimes enacted by the California 
voters to thirty-nine. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, PRIMARY ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET 32, 44 
(2000), available at libraryweb.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2000p.pdf; Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 
74, at S156. 
 79. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1)–(22) (West 2014). 
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by section 190.2, that, in turn, encompass thirty-nine categories of first-
degree murder.80 
Research demonstrates that, based on the breadth of section 190.2, a 
staggering percentage of murderers in California are statutorily eligible for 
the death penalty. Professors Steven Shatz and Nina Rivkind demonstrated 
that a comparison of the 1997 version of California’s first-degree murder 
statute and section 190.2 revealed that there were only seven narrow 
categories of first-degree murderers in California who were not statutorily 
death-eligible.81 Additionally, David Baldus, one of the authors of the study 
featured in the McCleskey case, performed his own analysis of the California 
death penalty, finding that, under the 2008 version of section 190.2, 95% of 
defendants convicted of first-degree murder were statutorily death-eligible.82 
In 2004, California established the California Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice (“Commission”) by California State Senate 
Resolution Number 44.83 The Commission was a bipartisan coalition of legal 
scholars and professionals tasked with analyzing, among other things, the 
administration of the death penalty in California.84 The Commission 
provided the most comprehensive review of the California death penalty in 
operation and explained simply that each year since 1978 far more inmates 
have been added to the death row population than have been executed.85 
The Commission identified several delays in California’s capital post-
conviction process. The first step in the post-conviction review process is the 
defendant’s automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court. The 
Commission found that, on average, inmates on death row waited three to 
five years to be appointed counsel for their direct appeal.86 Once counsel was 
appointed and all briefs were filed, the Commission identified a delay of more 
than two years in scheduling oral arguments before the California Supreme 
Court.87 The next step in the post-conviction review process is the inmate’s 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 73, at 1318. 
 82. Petitioner’s Evidentiary Hearing Exhibits: Amended Declaration of David C. Baldus at 
14, Ashmus v. Wong, No. 3:93-CV-00594-TEH (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2010) [hereinafter The Baldus 
Declaration]. 
 83. CALIFORNIA COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 
113 (Gerald Uelman ed., 2008), available at http://ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf 
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 84. Id. at 1–9. 
 85. Id. at 121. 
 86. Id. at 122. 
 87. Id. (explaining that, as of 2008, there was a backlog of eighty fully-briefed cases ready for 
oral argument, but the California Supreme Court only hears twenty to twenty-five such cases each 
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state habeas corpus application. The Commission discovered there was, on 
average, an eight- to ten-year delay in appointing counsel for state habeas 
corpus proceedings.88 Additionally, it took twenty-two months, on average, 
for the California Supreme Court to decide state habeas petitions in capital 
cases.89 The last step in the post-conviction process is the inmate’s federal 
habeas corpus application. The Commission found, on average, there was a 
longer than six-year delay for the federal courts to decide federal habeas 
petitions.90 Altogether, the estimated wait between sentencing and execution 
was twenty to twenty-five years.91 
The scope of the California death penalty scheme, combined with the 
delays discussed above, have led to an increase in the size and in the age of 
the state’s death row population. Since 1978, only thirteen prisoners in 
California have been executed, while, as of the summer of 2014, ninety-four 
prisoners had died from other causes while awaiting execution.92 Based on 
the size of California’s death row and the fact that no one has been executed 
in the state since 2006, the current ratio of more than seven-to-one deaths by 
other causes to executions will likely only grow in the future.93 Furthermore, 
of the 511 offenders sentenced to death in California between 1978 and 
1997, only eighty-one had exhausted their post-conviction appeals when 
Jones was decided.94 Of those eighty-one, 60% were granted post-conviction 
relief, and only seventeen remained on death row.95 At the time of the Jones 
decision, nearly half of those on death row, or 352 inmates, had yet to be 
assigned habeas counsel.96 As of the summer of 2014, there were 748 people 
on death row in California, making it, by far, the largest of its kind in the 
country.97 Of those 748 inmates, fifty-two had been on death row for more 
than thirty years.98 Additionally, there were 206 inmates who had been 
serving time on California’s death row for twenty to twenty-nine years, many 
 
year). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 122–23. 
 90. Id. at 123 (explaining that much of the delay in federal habeas proceedings is attributable 
to California courts’ failure to publish state habeas opinions and conduct evidentiary hearings). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
 93. Id. at 1062. 
 94. Id. at 1055. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1058. 
 97. Id. at 1053. See also Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 69. 
 98. See Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1069–87 app. A. 
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of whom were still waiting to complete their state habeas corpus review.99 
Even if California began executing one death row inmate per week, a truly 
unprecedented pace,100 it would still take more than fourteen years to execute 
every inmate currently on death row.101 
Based on the above data, the Commission resoundingly concluded that 
the California death penalty is broken. On the report’s very first page, the 
Commission concluded, “California’s death penalty is dysfunctional.”102 
Despite the Commission’s findings and conclusions, in the six years that 
passed between the Commission report and the Jones decision, the California 
Legislature did nothing to address the state’s death penalty problems. 
II. The Jones v. Chappell Case 
Unlike so many death penalty cases before it, the Jones decision is 
remarkable because it recognized the constitutional problems created by the 
California death penalty scheme as it is applied. This stands in contrast to 
the countless prior cases where courts have instead chosen to analyze the 
death penalty law on its face alone. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
Ernest Dewayne Jones was sentenced to death on April 7, 1995 for a 
murder committed in August 1992.103 After his sentence was imposed, Jones 
had to wait four years for counsel to be appointed to represent him for his 
direct appeal.104 Four years after appointment of counsel and after spending 
eight years on death row, the California Supreme Court affirmed Jones’s 
death sentence.105 In the meantime, Jones was appointed counsel for his state 
habeas petition in the fall of 2000, during the pendency of his direct 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. In Texas, the state responsible for the most executions by far in the United States, even 
in 2000, its most prolific year since 1982, only executed forty death row inmates. Executions, TEX. 
DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row 
/dr_executions_by_year.html (last updated Apr. 16, 2015). 
 101. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1062. 
 102. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 83, at 111. 
 103. First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Prisoner in State Custody at 415, 
Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 105) [hereinafter Jones’s Habeas 
Petition]. 
 104. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060. 
 105. People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762 (Cal. 2003). 
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appeal.106 Jones’s state habeas petition was filed in October 2002.107 It took 
the California Supreme Court until March 2009, six and a half years later, 
to deny Jones’s petition in an unpublished opinion.108 Finally, in March 2010, 
Jones timely filed his federal habeas petition, for which briefing was 
concluded in January 2014.109 
Nineteen years after being sentenced to death, Ernest Jones submitted 
his First Amended Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) in 
federal district court.110 The Petition was 454 pages long and included thirty 
claims for relief based on several alleged constitutional violations stemming 
from Jones’s conviction and death sentence.111 Jones’s twenty-seventh claim 
was a Lackey claim. He argued that, because he had been confined for nearly 
two decades—while living with the uncertainty of if and when his death 
sentence would ever be finalized—his sentence was unconstitutionally cruel 
and unusual.112 
Jones’s Amended Petition was prompted by an order of Judge Carney 
for supplemental briefing and oral arguments regarding the Lackey claim from 
Jones’s original petition.113 Judge Carney’s inquiry, however, was not strictly 
limited to an evaluation of the validity and viability of Jones’s Lackey claim as 
stated.114 Rather, Judge Carney encouraged the parties to 
submit, and to address in their briefing, the relevant statistics reported in 
the two law review articles referenced above, as well as any other reliable 
studies or public records addressing the delay associated with the 
administration of California’s death penalty, the number of individuals 
on death row and the likelihood that any of those individuals will ever be 
executed or will instead die of natural causes or suicide.115 
 The two law review articles referred to by Judge Carney were both 
written by Judge Arthur L. Alarcón of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and concerned the tremendous economic costs of the death 
penalty in California.116 Both articles only briefly mentioned the fact that 
 
 106. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Jones’s Habeas Petition, supra note 103. 
 111. Id. at 414–27. 
 112. Id. at 414, 424. 
 113. Order Re: Briefing and Settlement Discussions at 4–5, Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 
1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 103). 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. at 5. 
 116. See Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S41; See generally Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for 
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many more death row inmates have died from causes other than 
execution.117 In neither article was this fact addressed in the context of 
arbitrariness, as defined by Furman.118 Judge Carney’s order, however, gave 
a Furman twist to the Lackey claim, seeming to suggest that the long delays 
between sentencing and execution rendered any eventual execution 
arbitrary. In other words, those inmates were executed because they just so 
happened to survive long enough to be executed by the State. As discussed 
below, this was the basis for his final decision. 
B. The Opinion 
Judge Carney’s analysis of the issues associated with the delays in 
California’s post-conviction process was based on two premises: (1) “[N]o 
rational person can question that the execution of an individual carries with 
it the solemn obligation of the government to ensure that the punishment is 
not arbitrarily imposed and that it furthers the interests of society;”119 and (2) 
Judge Carney recognized that the death penalty is unlike any other 
punishment, and therefore it necessitates a corresponding heightened “‘need 
for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment 
in a specific case.’”120 
In order to reach the merits of the Jones’s arbitrariness claim, Judge 
Carney first had to address the issue of possible procedural bars. Under the 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal courts 
generally may not consider claims for habeas relief unless the inmate 
asserting the claim has exhausted the remedies available to him in state 
court.121 The State argued that Jones’s claims concerning delay were never 
addressed in state court and therefore were not exhausted.122 AEDPA, 
however, provides an exception to this procedural bar.123 Exhaustion is not 
required in cases where “‘circumstances exist that render [the state] process 
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.’”124 
Judge Carney explained that this exception applied in Jones because the 
delays associated with California’s post-conviction appeals process could not 
 
California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697 (2007). 
 117. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S53; Alarcón, supra note 116, at 724. 
 118. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 74, at S53; Alarcón, supra note 116, at 724. 
 119. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
 120. Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)). 
 121. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012). 
 122. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1067. 
 123. Id. at 1067. 
 124. Id. at 1068 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012)). 
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be solely attributed to the death row inmates themselves.125 Instead, the State 
bore responsibility for its inability to promptly appoint counsel for direct 
appeal,126 schedule oral arguments before the California Supreme Court,127 
and appoint state habeas counsel.128 According to Judge Carney, the State 
also underfunded state habeas investigations, which in turn slowed down the 
federal habeas review process.129 Judge Carney concluded that none of these 
delays, which together amount to more than twenty-five years, on average, 
were the result of self-serving “tactics” employed by death row inmates.130 In 
Judge Carney’s estimation, it would be futile to subject Jones’s claims to 
further review in California courts because the State’s procedures were the 
primary source of Jones’s delays in the first place.131 Furthermore, because 
there was no underlying state decision on the merits of Jones’s claims 
concerning the delays he experienced, his claims were not considered under 
AEDPA’s deferential standard.132 Therefore, the claim was not procedurally 
barred. 
In determining the death penalty regime in California was 
unconstitutionally arbitrary, Judge Carney relied heavily on Furman. He 
explained that Furman held that the death penalty “‘could not be imposed 
under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be 
inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.’”133 Judge Carney described 
the Furman Court as being preoccupied with the notion that the death penalty 
was being imposed in “an at best random manner against some individuals, 
with ‘no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [was] 
imposed from the many cases in which it [was] not.’”134 Judge Carney further 
explained that in the forty years since Furman, the Supreme Court has 
maintained that “the Constitution quite simply ‘cannot tolerate the infliction 
of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to 
be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.’”135 
 
 125. Id. at 1066. 
 126. Id. (explaining that, on average, it takes three to five years for counsel to be appointed for 
direct appeal). 
 127. Id. (explaining that it usually takes two to three years to schedule oral arguments before 
the Supreme Court). 
 128. Id. (explaining that it takes at least eight to ten years to appoint state habeas counsel). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1068. 
 132. Id. at 1068 n.23. 
 133. Id. at 1061 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)). 
 134. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). 
 135. Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
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Applying the facts of delay associated with Jones’s case and, the systemic 
delays in California’s capital appeals process, Judge Carney concluded that 
the criterion for executing inmates “will depend upon a factor largely outside 
an inmate’s control, and wholly divorced from the penological purposes the 
State sought to achieve by sentencing him to death in the first instance: how 
quickly the inmate proceeds through the State’s dysfunctional post-
conviction review process.”136 
Judge Carney was concerned that, unlike many death row inmates, 
Jones faced a meaningful threat of execution.137 Judge Carney addressed his 
concern by presenting data about Jones’s place in the post-conviction process 
relative to those inmates sentenced to death in the same year.138 Of the thirty-
eight inmates sentenced to death in 1995, Jones and only six others had 
completed their state habeas proceedings.139 Moreover, Jones appeared to be 
even further along in the post-conviction appeals process as compared to 
some inmates who had been on death row much longer. Of the 511 inmates 
sentenced to death between 1978 and 1997 whose convictions were not 
overturned by the California Supreme Court, 380 remained on death row at 
the time of the Jones decision.140 Two hundred eighty-five of those inmates 
had been on death row longer than Jones, and, of those inmates, more than 
a third were still litigating their state habeas petitions.141 In the eyes of Judge 
Carney, those individuals still litigating their state habeas petitions after 
decades on death row did not face the “realistic possibility” of execution.142 
Judge Carney concluded, “[B]ecause of the inordinate delays inherent in 
California’s system, many of the rest [of the inmates in earlier stages of the 
appeals process] will never be executed. They will instead live out their lives 
on Death Row.”143 
Ultimately, Judge Carney concluded that the systemic delays in the 
post-conviction process resulted in the arbitrary execution of death row 
 
 136. Id. at 1062. 
 137. Id. at 1063 (“Were his petition denied today, Mr. Jones would . . . have his federal habeas 
petition under review by the Ninth Circuit, effectively the last available stage before execution.”). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1069 app. A. Three hundred eighty of the original 511 inmates remained after 
thirteen were executed, thirty-nine were granted relief in federal habeas proceedings, and seventy-
nine died on death row from causes other than execution. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1063. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (quoting Gerald F. Uelman, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California 
Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 495, 496 (2009) (“‘For all practical purposes, a sentence of death in 
California is a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.’”). 
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inmates, thereby sapping the death penalty of either of its supposed 
penological purposes: retribution or deterrence.144 To begin, Judge Carney 
expressed doubt as to whether the death penalty serves as a deterrent under 
any circumstances.145 With undertones of a Lackey argument, Judge Carney 
explained that, for the death penalty to have any deterrent effect, it must be 
administered in a timely manner.146 If not, as with the case in California, 
“[t]he reasonable expectation of an individual contemplating a capital crime 
in California then is that if he is caught, it does not matter whether he is 
sentenced to death—he realistically faces only life imprisonment.”147 Finally, 
Judge Carney dismissed the possibility that the California death penalty 
served as a deterrent by evoking Justice Stewart’s now-famous comparison 
of the death sentence to being struck by lightning:148 “Under such a system, 
the death penalty is about as effective a deterrent to capital crime as the 
possibility of a lightning strike is to going outside in the rain.”149 
Judge Carney also believed that the death penalty as applied in 
California did not serve retributive purpose. He reached this conclusion 
based on the fact that every inmate on death row committed an act the State 
deemed terrible enough to warrant punishment by death, yet inmates wait 
on average twenty-five years to complete the appeals process.150 As a result, 
many die before being executed, rendering the possibility of retribution in 
those cases moot.151 Judge Carney was concerned that the delays were 
unnecessary and were created by the State of California, explaining, “Were 
such lengthy delay an isolated, or even necessary, circumstance of a system 
that otherwise acts purposefully to give meaning to society’s moral outrage, 
the retributive purpose of the death penalty might continue to be served.”152 
Judge Carney concluded the death penalty cannot serve society’s moral 
outrage if it is exercised against a random sampling of those whose crimes 
 
 144. Id. at 1063. 
 145. Id. at 1063–64 (“Whether the death penalty has any deterrent effect when administered 
in a functional system is a widely contested issue upon which no clear empirical consensus has been 
reached.”). 
 146. Id. at 1064 (citing COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 83, at 115 n.8 (“If there is a deterrent 
value [to the death penalty], however, it is certainly dissipated by long intervals between judgment 
of death and its execution.”)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death 
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual.”). 
 149. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1064. 
 150. Id. at 1065. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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society has deemed worthy of death.153 
III. The Consequences of Jones 
In holding the California death penalty unconstitutional, the Jones 
decision, if it stands, will result in Jones’s and others’ death sentences being 
commuted in California. Additionally, the decision may have a significant 
impact on the viability of future empirical challenges to the death penalty. 
A. The Impact of Jones on California’s Death Row 
Judge Carney held that the California death penalty is unconstitutional, 
at least as applied to Jones and his similarly situated cohort. That cohort 
includes all death row inmates sentenced to death in California on April 7, 
1995—the day Jones received his death sentence—or before. If the Jones 
decision survives appeal in the Ninth Circuit, and then perhaps the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the death sentences of Jones and the 285 inmates sentenced 
before him presumably would be vacated and replaced with the sentence of 
life without the possibility of parole.154 Jones does not, however, directly 
impact the death sentences of California inmates sentenced after 1995 
because Jones challenged the California death penalty scheme in application 
rather than on its face. Theoretically, at least, Jones’s challenge can only 
account for his experience and the experience of those who were sentenced 
to death before him.  
Undoubtedly, inmates sentenced to death in California after 1995 have 
experienced, and will likely continue to experience, long delays between 
sentencing and execution.155 It will be up to the inmates to test the limits of 
Judge Carney’s decision and whether it can be applied to a petitioner who 
has spent less than nineteen years on death row. Jones cannot be read as 
creating a bright-line rule concerning delay because Judge Carney hints that 
an isolated incident of delay would be constitutionally permissible.156 Only 
when the delays are systemic, as they were determined to be in Jones, do they 
violate the Eighth Amendment. 
There is also the faint possibility that the delays plaguing the 
administration of the death penalty in California could be remedied, in 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1063. 
 155. See supra Part I.B. 
 156. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (“Were such lengthy delay an isolated, or even necessary, 
circumstance . . . the [constitutionally] retributive purpose of the death penalty might continue to 
be served.”). 
LEVY_FINALEDITS_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 1:09 PM 
670 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 
 
which case a so-called “Jones claim” would no longer be viable. Judge Carney 
suggested that the constitutional problem posed by the inordinate delays in 
California post-conviction process is curable. In particular, Judge Carney 
focused on the 2008 Commission Report that outlined several changes to 
California’s post-conviction process, which could increase its efficiency 
dramatically.157 Judge Carney seemed particularly concerned with bringing 
California’s delay between sentencing and execution in line with the national 
average, which was twelve and a half years between 2000 and 2012.158 The 
Commission estimated that, if the State implemented its recommended 
changes, the average delay would decrease to between eleven and fourteen 
years.159 Although far from drawing a bright line when the California death 
penalty would be constitutional again, the Jones decision makes clear that the 
status quo is unacceptable. The State of California must take action to 
streamline its post-conviction appeals process if it would like to maintain the 
death penalty in the state. 
B. Future Empirical Challenges to the Death Penalty in 
California 
Using empirical evidence in evaluating the constitutionality of death 
penalty law means requiring courts not to accept on faith that a scheme 
works the way it is supposed to. Judge Carney’s decision, for the first time, 
validates looking beyond the words of death penalty statutes. As discussed 
above, Judge Carney focused his criticism on the narrow issue of the delays 
in the post-conviction process and the resulting arbitrariness of inmates dying 
from causes other than execution. The Jones decision, however, ignores the 
other arbitrary ways in which the death penalty is meted out in California. 
Nonetheless, Jones is remarkable because it is the first time that any court has 
meaningfully evaluated empirical evidence in order to assess the realities of 
the California death penalty. In this regard, the approach used in Jones of 
determining the unconstitutionality of the California death penalty scheme 
in application may provide a road map for other courts determining the 
soundness of death penalty schemes in light of evidence that the scheme 
operates arbitrarily, regardless of the source of that arbitrariness.  
The opinion in Jones is filled with powerful statistical evidence regarding 
the shortcomings of the California death penalty.160 These statistics, which 
 
 157. Id. at 1067. 
 158. Id. The average delay between sentencing and execution nationwide rose to 15.8 years in 
the year 2012. Id. 
 159. Id.; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 83, at 124. 
 160. See supra Part I.B. 
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both quantified the delays in the post-conviction process generally, and 
situated Jones relative to his peers, demonstrate the random nature by which 
death row inmates die in California. In this regard, Jones is an empirically 
based decision because Judge Carney relied on real world statistical evidence 
in holding the California scheme unconstitutional. 
In general, there are two types of empirically based studies of the death 
penalty that can and have been used to attack the constitutionality of death 
sentences. First, there are “no-narrowing” challenges, which are directed at 
the statutory schemes that do not provide a meaningful basis for 
distinguishing between those murderers who receive the death penalty and 
those who do not.161 Second are studies that demonstrate actual arbitrariness 
in the death penalty based on the influence of impermissible factors such as 
race, gender, and geography.162 
The challenge articulated in Jones does not seem to fit neatly into either 
of these categories. One could argue that the challenge is its own unique 
blend, drawing on both Furman and Lackey, and therefore does not have 
anything to contribute to future challenges that do not involve arbitrariness 
resulting from the long delays between sentencing and execution. The 
influence of Jones’s Lackey claim is apparent throughout the opinion. It is 
especially prominent in the discussions as to whether the death penalty in 
California serves any penological purpose. To that end, Judge Carney 
explained, “As for the random few for whom execution does become a 
reality, they will have languished for so long on Death Row that their 
execution will serve no retributive or deterrent purpose and will be 
arbitrary.”163 
The Jones decision, however, is based on concrete, indisputable 
empirical evidence, as opposed to some abstract analysis of how the 
California death penalty is theoretically supposed to work. As discussed 
above, Judge Carney clearly articulated that arbitrariness is arbitrariness and 
impermissible no matter where it occurs in the process of handing down a 
death sentence. In other words, the Eighth Amendment does not permit the 
influence of arbitrariness regardless of where it originates, be it the delay 
between sentence and execution, racial bias, or any other source. In this 
regard, the Jones decision may have profound implications for future 
empirically based challenges to the California death penalty scheme. 
 
 161. See generally Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 73; The Baldus Declaration, supra note 82. 
 162. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on Death 
Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2005); Shatz & 
Dalton, supra note 10, at 1229. 
 163. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1053. 
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Fortunately for opponents of the death penalty, legal scholarship is filled 
with studies demonstrating the ways in which the California death penalty is 
arbitrary. The data from some of these studies has already served as the basis 
for legal challenges, still others have yet to be used, but in either case, the 
viability of legal challenges based on data may increase in the aftermath of 
Jones. 
1. No-Narrowing Challenges 
No-narrowing challenges are rooted in the idea that Furman was 
concerned that, of the many death-eligible crimes committed in Georgia, 
very few actually resulted in a death sentence.164 As discussed above, the 
Court relied on the statistic that only 15 to 20% of all death-eligible 
murderers were ultimately sentenced to death in Georgia at the time of 
Furman.165 Without establishing a bright-line rule, the Court in Furman 
established implicitly that this rate was below the permissible constitutional 
threshold. 
Research demonstrates that California’s ratio of death-eligible crimes 
committed to the number of resulting death sentences is considerably lower 
than the ratio discussed in Furman. The problem lies with section 190.2 of the 
California Penal Code, which outlines the special circumstances that may be 
applied to elevate a first-degree murder to a death-eligible offense.166 
Professors Shatz and Rivkind demonstrated that under the 1997 version of 
the statute, seven out of eight, or well over 80%, first-degree murderers in 
California were statutorily eligible for the death penalty.167 Conversely, only 
one out of those eight defendants was eventually sentenced to death.168 Thus, 
California’s death penalty rate, from 1988 to 1992, as calculated by Shatz 
and Rivkind’s study, was 11.4%, well below the rate found to be 
unconstitutional in Furman.169 
David Baldus performed his own analysis of the California death 
penalty.170 The purpose of his study was, in part, to examine the scope of 
death eligibility under California law.171 His study analyzed a sample taken 
 
 164. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 386 n.11 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Shatz & 
Dalton, supra note 10, at 1231. 
 165. Furman, 408 U.S. at 386 n.11; Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1231. 
 166. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2014). 
 167. Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 73, at 1332. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. The Baldus Declaration, supra note 82, at 2. 
 171. Id. 
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from 27,453 homicide cases occurring in California between January 1, 1978 
and June 30, 2002.172 Professor Baldus’s California study demonstrated that 
only 4.6% of all death-eligible offenders were sentenced to death in the state, 
which is considerably lower that the 15 to 20% at issue in Furman.173 
Despite the evidence that section 190.2 does not meaningfully narrow 
the class of death-eligible offenders, the California Supreme Court has, time 
and time again, approved the California scheme on its face, without looking 
at whether section 190.2 actually has the required narrowing effect.174 In Ben-
Sholom v. Ayers,175 however, one court at least addressed, in dicta, the breadth 
of death eligibility in California. Judge Anthony Ishii of the District Court for 
the Eastern District of California recognized “the class of [death-eligible] 
murderers to be very broad under the California scheme.”176 Judge Ishii 
concluded that “the merits of the [no-narrowing] claim could be considered 
debatable among reasonable jurists.”177 
Jones could have a powerful effect on the impact of no-narrowing 
challenges going forward. If, as in Jones, the California Supreme Court, or 
any other court for that matter, examined the statistical evidence of the 
breadth of section 190.2, they would likely have to find that the statute is 
impermissibly broad. It is difficult to fathom that a court could look at the 
evidence, such as the research by Professors Shatz and Rivkind, or that of 
David Baldus, and come to any other conclusion. The impact of Jones is that 
it may provide future courts with a model for how to assess the 
constitutionality of the California death penalty by using statistical analysis 
in ascertaining how the scheme actually operates. 
2. Evidence of Actual Arbitrariness 
As discussed above, the McCleskey decision signaled to many the 
foreclosure of any future challenges to the death penalty based on empirical 
evidence.178 Despite those signals, several legal scholars and social scientists 
have conducted studies of the impact of arbitrary factors on the application 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 29. 
 174. See, e.g., People v. Ray, 914 P.2d 846, 872 (Cal. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 967 (1996); 
People v. Arias, 913 P.2d. 980, 1040–41 (Cal. 1996), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1251 (1997). 
 175. No. 1:93-CV-05531 AWI, 2008 WL 4167079, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at *3. The Ninth Circuit did not address this issue on appeal, claiming that it was not 
ripe because Ben-Sholom’s death sentence had been vacated. Ben-Sholom v. Ayers, 674 F.3d 1095, 
1097 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 178. Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1241. 
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of the death penalty in California. These studies demonstrate that the death 
penalty has been significantly influenced by improper factors such as race, 
geography, and gender. 
Professors Glenn L. Pierce and Michael L. Radelet analyzed racial and 
geographic disparities in the imposition of the death penalty by conducting 
a study of all homicides committed in California between 1990 and 1999.179 
Just as in McCleskey, this study showed that the race of a murder victim 
dramatically affected the likelihood that the death penalty would be 
imposed.180 Pierce and Radelet found that murders involving white victims 
were 3.7 times more likely to result in a death sentence than those involving 
African American victims.181 Similarly, murderers whose victims were white 
were 4.7 times more likely to be sentenced to death than those who killed 
Hispanic victims.182 These disparities are in line with results of similar studies 
in other states.183 
Pierce and Radelet further determined that the location where a crime 
was committed had a significant effect on the likelihood that the death 
penalty would be imposed.184 Their study revealed large variations in the 
death sentencing rates of different counties,185 leading them to conclude 
“death sentencing in California is highest in counties with a low population 
density and a high proportion of non-Hispanic white residents.”186 
A recent study by Professor Steven Shatz and Naomi Shatz found 
disparities in the application of the death penalty on the basis of the victim’s 
gender as well as the gender of the defendant involved in the crime.187 After 
analyzing roughly 1,300 first-degree murder convictions over a three-year 
period, they found that defendants involved in a single-victim murder, where 
that victim was female, were more than seven times as likely to receive the 
death penalty than if the victim was male.188 Furthermore, women represent 
5.3% of convicted, death-eligible, first-degree murderers not sentenced to 
 
 179. Pierce & Radelet, supra note 162, at 12–13. 
 180. Id. at 19. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1248–51. 
 184. Pierce & Radelet, supra note 162, at 31. 
 185. Id. at 38 (“Excluding counties with smaller populations, death sentencing rates vary from 
roughly .005% of all homicides to rates five times higher.”). 
 186. Id. at 31. 
 187. Steven F. Shatz & Naomie R. Shatz, Chivalry is Not Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death 
Penalty, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 64, 105–10 (2012). 
 188. Id. at 92–93, 107. 
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death, yet they make up only 1.2% of those sentenced to death.189  
Moreover, another study by Professor Shatz and Professor Terry 
Dalton demonstrated that even the crime’s location within an individual 
county dramatically affects the likelihood that the death penalty will be 
imposed. The study examined 473 first-degree murder convictions in 
Alameda County, California occurring between 1978 and 2001.190 The study 
found that those murders committed in the southern half of the county, 
which is vastly more suburban and populated by white residents, were over 
2.5 times more likely to result in a death sentence than those committed in 
the more urban North County, where the majority of residents are people of 
color.191 Furthermore, the murders in South County were no more 
aggravated than the ones committed in North County, and thus this could 
not provide an alternative explanation for the disparate results.192 
3. Jones’s Potential Impact on the Utility of Empirical Studies 
Putting aside the equal protection arguments prompted by these 
statistics, which are beyond the scope of this Note, the decision in Jones could 
impact the applicability of these types of studies in making legal challenges 
to the death penalty based on a violation of the Eighth Amendment.193 These 
studies indicate the administration of the death penalty in California is 
influenced by the legally impermissible factors of race, geography, and 
gender. In McCleskey, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with very 
similar evidence and essentially ignored these factors because the Court had 
settled into the practice of approving death penalty statutes simply on their 
face. To the five Justices in the majority, the statistics presented in McCleskey 
were an afterthought, because, in their eyes, the Georgia scheme was 
theoretically sound. Jones potentially moves past that presumption. In Jones, 
Judge Carney looked to the data that demonstrated what the practical effects 
of the California scheme were and continue to be, and determined that the 
situation was constitutionally unacceptable. 
Conclusion 
There is no meaningful distinction between the empirical evidence 
relied on in Jones and the statistics presented in the other types of challenges 
 
 189. Id. at 106. 
 190. Shatz & Dalton, supra note 10, at 1260. 
 191. Id. at 1267. 
 192. Id. at 1268. 
 193. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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to the California death penalty. Empirical evidence continues to mount, 
demonstrating that the death penalty in California is overly broad, 
discriminatorily imposed, and arbitrarily carried out in ways discussed above. 
Evidence of California’s death penalty scheme’s practical effects, or any other 
state’s for that matter, are important and should no longer be ignored. The 
statistics show how arbitrarily the death penalty actually works in practice 
and demonstrate that it must either be modified or eradicated. The Jones 
decision may finally provide an opening for other courts to holistically assess 
the death penalty in California, its practical applications, and find it 
unconstitutional as well. 
